In a distributed system, it is often important to detect the causal relationships between events, where event e1 is causally before event e2 if e1 happened before e2 and could possibly have a ected the occurrence of e2. In this paper we argue that it can be essential to security that a process determine, in the face of malicious attack, how two events are causally related. We formulate attacks on causality detection in terms of causal denial and forgery, formalize possible security goals with respect to causality, and present simple algorithms to attain these goals in some situations.
INTRODUCTION
In a distributed system, it is often important to detect the causal relationships between events, where event e 1 is causally before event e 2 if e 1 happened before e 2 and could possibly have a ected the occurrence of e 2 Lamport, 1978] . Causality has been recognized as fundamental to distributed computing and forms the basis for event orderings in many distributed systems and distributed service implementations (e.g., Peterson et al., 1989; Schneider, 1990; Ladin et al., 1992] ). For instance, several systems implement communication primitives that deliver messages in an order consistent with the causal relationships among the messages (i.e., among the events in which the messages were sent). This causal order can be seen as an extension of FIFO order to a setting with multiple senders and receivers, and is especially useful in systems that exploit asynchronous communication for performance .
Here we argue that it can be essential to security that a process determine, in the face of malicious attack, how two events are causally related. The view of causality that we take is very di erent from that taken by previous treatments of causality in the security literature. Previous studies of causality and security have occurred in the context of multi-level information ow, where one goal is, informally, to prevent events at higher-level ob-A preliminary version of this paper appeared in the Proceedings of the 1993 IEEE Symposium on Research in Security and Privacy. The rst author was partially supported under DARPA/ONR grant N00014-92-J-1866, and by grants from GTE, IBM, and Siemens, Inc. Any opinions, conclusions or recommendations expressed in this document are those of the authors and do not necessarily re ect the views or decisions of the ONR.
jects from causally preceding events at, and thus carrying information to, lower-level objects. That is, in previous works, causal relationships have been viewed as something to be avoided in order to achieve noninterference Goguen and Meseguer, 1982] .
In contrast, we claim that because of the fundamental role of causality in distributed systems, the accurate detection (but not elimination) of causal relationships can be crucial to security in distributed systems. This was rst illustrated by Reiter et al. 1992] by the following example of \insider trading": suppose that a trader issues a request to a trading service to purchase shares of stock, and then as a result of an (indirect or direct) interaction with another trader, the other trader infers that this request has been made. If the latter trader is able to submit a request to the trading service in such a way that the two requests appear to be concurrent, the service could be fooled into processing the latter trader's request rst. The result could be that the request of the latter trader could increase the apparent demand for the stock and thus the price o ered to the former trader, or enable the latter trader to illegally bene t in a fashion similar to options frontrunning Smith and Tygar, 1994] . To prevent these activities, the trading service must recognize that the request of the latter trader is causally after that of the former, and should process that of the former rst.
As another example of the importance of causality detection to security, consider a scenario in which a company announces to the trading network that it is merging with another company. Suppose that a trader with inside information of this merger requested to buy large quantities of the company's stock prior to the announcement but, to avoid suspicion, attempted to make it appear that the request was initiated causally after the announcement. If the trading service accepts that the request was initiated causally after the announcement, then the insider trading may go undetected.
More generally, because of the fundamental importance of causality to so many distributed algorithms, the conversion of these algorithms for use in a hostile environment necessarily relies upon the accurate detection of causal relationships despite malicious behavior. For instance, consider a service that allocates a distributed resource to processes in an order consistent with the causal relationships among their requests Schneider, 1990] . If such a service is to be fair in a hostile setting, it must be able to detect causal relationships accurately, despite attempts of dishonest processes to wrongfully make their requests appear causally prior to other requests.
The above examples show that the type of causality detection required can di er from one circumstance to the next. As shown in the rst trading example, it may be required that if a causal relationship exists, then it is detected. On the other hand, in the second example, security relies on an inverse requirement, namely that if a causal relationship is detected, then it actually exists. Thus, depending on the circumstances, it may be important that a principal not be able to deny existing causal relationships or to claim nonexistent ones without being detected.
In this paper we formalize possible security goals with respect to causality and present simple algorithms to attain these goals in some situations. This work generalizes and improves upon the treatment of causality by Reiter et al. 1992] in two ways. First, this work presents a general framework in which attacks on causality can be examined; in this framework, we were able to identify attacks that are not considered by Reiter et al. 1992] . Second, we present new algorithms to counter these attacks.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we describe the assumptions that we make about the system. In Section 3, we formally de ne the notion of causality. In Section 4 we formalize our security goals with respect to causality. In Sections 5 and 6 we describe several algorithms for reaching these goals. A relationship between causality and the notion of freshness is discussed in Section 7. We summarize and describe related and future work in Section 8.
THE SYSTEM MODEL
We assume a system consisting of a set P = fP 1 ; : : :; P n g of processes that are spatially separated and that communicate exclusively via a completely connected, point-to-point network. We often denote pro-
The results of this paper can be extended for multicast communication, although multicast complicates the algorithms and discussion with little bene t. Thus, for simplicity we treat only point-to-point communication here.
cesses with the letters P, Q, R and S when subscripts are unnecessary. Processes that behave according to their design speci cation are said to be correct. Processes may be corrupted and thereafter may exhibit arbitrarily malicious behavior, limited only by the assumptions stated below.
The execution of each process is modeled as a sequence of indivisible events. There are two types of events that can be executed by processes: sending a message m to a process, denoted by send(m), and receiving a message m from a process, denoted by receive (m). (Internal computations are not explicitly modeled.) Messages are identi ed by their send events and not their contents; e.g., messages with the same contents sent in di erent events are di erent messages for our purposes.
We assume that each process receives only messages that are sent to it (or by it; see below). In particular, communication channels between correct processes are authenticated and protect the integrity and the secrecy of communication, so that corrupt processes cannot tamper with or receive this communication. In addition, all communication between corrupt processes is modeled with explicit sends and receives, regardless of its actual form (e.g., signals via a covert channel). We also assume that channels between correct processes provide FIFO delivery using, for instance, a standard sequence number mechanism Voydock and Kent, 1983] .
Many algorithms for detecting causality in benign environments utilize assumptions of synchronized clocks or bounded communication delays (e.g., Schneider, 1990] ). However, we do not assume that processes maintain synchronized clocks, or that message transmission times between processes or execution speeds of processes are bounded. That is, the system is totally asynchronous.
Finally, to simplify the following discussion, it is convenient to stipulate that at each process, the event send(m) is immediately followed by receive (m), with no other events occurring between these two. So, a message is received by its sender and (possibly) by its intended destination.
DEFINITION OF CAUSALITY
We use the notion of causality formulated by Lamport 1978] . As described in Section 1, one event is causally before another if it could have a ected that other event.
More precisely, suppose we de ne the \one-step" causality relation ; as the smallest relation satisfying the 
CAUSAL SECURITY GOALS
In Section 1, we discussed several examples in which the detection of causal relationships was important for security. In this section we attempt to more carefully formulate security goals with respect to causality. We introduce two notions, denial and forgery, that capture the ways in which e orts to detect causal relationships between messages can fail due to malicious or accidental behavior, and discuss how these notions relate to the examples of Section 1. Sections 5 and 6 are devoted to preventing denial and forgery, respectively. Since there is a version of denial and forgery for each causality detection algorithm, when de ning these notions it is convenient to abstract all such algorithms as a predicate C on pairs of messages. That is, we assume that a process determines if message m 1 is causally before message m 2 by evaluating C(m 1 ; m 2 ). If C(m 1 ; m 2 ) evaluates to true, then the process \be-lieves" that m 1 ! m 2 ; otherwise, it \believes" that m 1 6 ! m 2 , where 6 ! is the complement of !. Thus, C has the following desired behavior: C(m 1 ; m 2 ) = true if m 1 ! m 2 , false otherwise. A correct process P generally need not be able to evaluate C on all pairs of messages, but should be able to compute C(m 1 ; m 2 ) if both receive(m 1 ) and receive(m 2 ) are executed at P. (Recall that if a process executes send(m), then it also executes receive(m).) In the remainder of this paper, we concern ourselves only with predicates that a process evaluates on messages it receives.
Given C, we can now de ne the notions of denial and forgery, which can occur due to malicious or accidental behavior, if C is not robust to such behavior.
Denial: A causal relationship is denied (with respect to C) if there exist messages m 1 and m 2 such that m 1 ! m 2 , but at some correct process C(m 1 ; m 2 ) is false.
Forgery: A causal relationship is forged (with respect to C) if there exist messages m 1 and m 2 such that m 1 6 ! m 2 , but at some correct process C(m 1 ; m 2 ) is true.
We have already seen examples of how denial and forgery can result in security problems. For instance, reconsider the trading examples in Section 1, which are represented pictorially in Figure 1 . In the rst example, the second trader Q attempts to deny that its request m 2 is causally after P's request m 1 as a result of its interacting with P (possibly through other processes S). If the attempt is successful, the trading service R may fail to recognize that m 1 should be serviced before m 2 . The second example illustrates the dangers of forgery: the trading service R should not interpret the request m 2 from the trader Q to be causally after the announcement m 1 from the company P when in reality it is not. 
Causality detection
The next two sections of this paper are devoted to nding algorithms to prevent denial or forgery in various situations. In general, to prevent denial it must be the case that In order to rule out trivial solutions that provide no causal information, we also require that our algorithms satisfy the following property in addition to preventing denial and/or forgery: E: If there exists a causal chain e 1 ; : : :; e l such that e 1 = send(m 1 ), e l = send(m 2 ), and for each j 2 f1; : : :; lg, e j was executed at a correct process, then at any correct recipient of m 1 and m 2 , C(m 1 ; m 2 ) is true and C(m 2 ; m 1 ) is false.
Property E requires that a causal chain traversing only correct processes be recognized, and thus intuitively represents the \minimum" required of a causality detection algorithm. For our purposes, E serves to rule out some trivial algorithms that provide no causal information, such as \C(m 1 ; m 2 ) = false for all m 1 and m 2 " (which satis es F) and \C(m 1 ; m 2 ) = true for all m 1 and m 2 " (which satis es D).
In Sections 5 and 6, we concentrate on nding algorithms to satisfy E always, and D or F if the sender of m 1 (in the statement of D and F) is correct. In Section 5, we present two algorithms that satisfy E and that satisfy D if the sender of m 1 is correct. Then, in Section 6, we present two algorithms that satisfy E and that satisfy F if the sender of m 1 is correct. What can be done to satisfy D and/or F when the sender of m 1 is corrupt is an open problem. However, the algorithm in Section 6.2 also satis es a property with only a slightly weaker consequent than F, even if both the senders of m 1 and m 2 are corrupt. We suspect that this property may su ce in some situations.
PREVENTING DENIAL
In this section we discuss two methods for preventing denial attacks. More precisely, the algorithms discussed in this section ensure that if a correct process R receives messages m 1 and m 2 , where the sender of m 1 is correct and m 1 ! m 2 , then C(m 1 ; m 2 ) is true when evaluated at R. So, in the example of Figure 1 , these protocols ensure that if m 1 is causally before m 2 , then Q cannot \backdate" m 2 to appear causally before or concurrent with m 1 .
The causality server
Our rst solution employs a trusted causality server. Intuitively, the causality server acts as an intermediary between all pairs of processes in the system. Each correct process directly communicates with (i.e., sends messages to or receives messages from) only the causality server, via an authenticated, FIFO channel that protects the integrity and secrecy of communication. For one process to send a message to another process, the former sends it to the causality server. For each process R, the causality server forwards messages destined for R to R, in the order in which the server receives those messages (see Figure 2) . This simple causality server ensures that if processes detect causal relationships with C(m 1 ; m 2 ) = true if m 1 is received before m 2 , false otherwise, then it is not possible for a corrupt process to deny the causal relationships that its messages have with causally prior messages from correct processes. The causality server CS forwards messages destined for a process to that process in the order in which it receives those messages. such that m 1 ! m 2 and the sender of m 1 is correct. Also suppose that R is a (correct) recipient of m 1 and m 2 . If R is the sender of m 1 (i.e., R sent m 1 to another process), then because m 1 is received at R immediately after it is sent, R receives m 1 before m 2 . Now suppose some other process sends m 1 to R. Because the channel from the sender of m 1 to the causality server is FIFO, m 1 must arrive at the causality server before any message m such that m 1 ! m. So, m 1 is forwarded to (and thus is received by) R before any such message destined for R, and in particular, before m 2 .
E: Suppose there exists a causal chain e 1 ; : : :; e l such that e 1 = send(m 1 ), e l = send(m 2 ), and for each j 2 f1; : : :; lg, e j is executed at a correct process.
By the argument for D, C(m 1 ; m 2 ) is true at any correct recipient of m 1 and m 2 . Then, because if m 1 is received before m 2 then m 2 is received after m 1 , C(m 2 ; m 1 ) is false.
A warranted concern with the use of a causality server is performance: this scheme results in twice as many messages being transmitted over the network than without the causality server, and the server may become a tra c bottleneck in the system. However, the degree to which a causality server would become a bottleneck might be less than at rst expected, because the causality server has very little processing to do on each message it receives and forwards. In fact, in a likely implementation it would simply need to decrypt the message, appropriately check and attach channel sequence numbers (to implement FIFO order), re-encrypt the message, and forward it. Supposing that encryption and decryption can be done in hardware, the performance impact seen by processes could be tolerable.
A second concern with this scheme is that it introduces a single point of failure, namely the causalSecuring Causal Relationships in Distributed Systems 5 ity server, into the system, because all communication would cease if the causality server failed. This problem can be addressed using known replication techniques (e.g., Schneider, 1990; Reiter and Birman, 1994] ), albeit at an additional cost to performance.
The conservative approach
An alternative approach to the use of a causality server is for each process P to delay sending a message to its destination until all messages that P previously sent to other destinations have been received at those destinations. y In general, a sender can be informed of the receipt of its messages by acknowledgements. These acknowledgements would occur as part of a lower layer protocol, and would not result in additional process events or be delayed like messages. z Processes again detect causal relationships with the predicate C(m 1 ; m 2 ) = true if m 1 is received before m 2 , false otherwise. This approach, sometimes called the conservative approach, has been used by several systems to detect causal relationships in benign environments (e.g., Schneider, 1990; ). It is especially y A further condition is required if multicast communication is used (see ). However, as stated in Section 2, we restrict ourselves in this paper to point-to-point communication.
z These acknowledgements could be viewed as introducing additional causal relationships. However, since acknowledgements carry no application-speci c information, these relationships are unlikely to be of interest in most settings and thus are omitted from the present discussion. attractive in our setting because a correct process can singlehandedly prevent corrupt processes from \back-dating" their messages to wrongly appear causally prior to or concurrent with its own. That is, it need not rely on a third party for this guarantee. Moreover, this solution introduces no bottleneck or single point of failure into the system.
Communication performance achieved with the conservative approach can vary widely, depending on the particular communication patterns exhibited by processes. Because a process delays sending a message to a destination only when it does not know of the receipt of a message it previously sent to a di erent destination, processes can achieve the full performance bene ts of asynchronous communication when streaming messages to a single destination. However, when processes send to many di erent destinations in quick succession, the communications are essentially reduced to synchronous remote procedure calls.
>From a security point of view, the most signi cant disadvantage of the conservative protocol is the potential for denial-of-service attacks. A corrupt process can prevent a sender of a message from being able to send to any other destinations by refusing to acknowledge any messages sent to it. (This form of \attack" can occur even in benign environments if a process simply crashes.) Di erent policies can be implemented to deal with this problem, and which is best depends on the particular system and application. One approach is implemented in the Isis system, which uses a version of the conservative protocol adapted for multicast communication Reiter et al., 1992] . In Isis, a trusted, fault-tolerant service called the failure detector declares processes faulty when they appear so and excludes them from the system Ricciardi and Birman, 1991] . Using this approach with minor modi cations to address malicious process behavior, it is possible to ensure that a process that attempts denial-of-service attacks by refusing to acknowledge messages will eventually be considered faulty and excluded from the system. Any process waiting for acknowledgements from the excluded process would be allowed to proceed with sending to other processes without jeopardizing causality detection, even if the excluded process was correct but deemed faulty due to network delays.
6. PREVENTING FORGERY In this section we present two algorithms that satisfy F if the sender of m 1 is correct. That is, they ensure that if a correct process R receives m 1 and m 2 , the sender of m 1 is correct, and m 1 6 ! m 2 , then C(m 1 ; m 2 ) is false when evaluated at R. As discussed in Section 4, satisfying F under only the assumption that the sender of m 2 is correct is an open problem. However, the second algorithm presented here does satisfy a property with only a slightly weaker consequent than F, even if both the senders of m 1 and m 2 are corrupt. We believe that especially in the case in which the sender of m 2 is correct, this property may su ce for some applications.
These algorithms use a digital signature scheme. We assume that each process P i holds a private key K i with which it can sign information so that any other process can verify the information's origin and authenticity. Information m so signed is denoted fmg Ki .
Signed vector timestamps
Our rst algorithm originates from a technique introduced by Lamport 1978] , where he described an algorithm using logical clocks to detect causal relationships among messages (in benign environments). In his technique, each process P i maintains a logical clock t i that assigns a value t i e] to each event e executed at P i , according to the following constraint known as the clock condition:
T1: For any events e 1 and e 2 , if e 1 ! e 2 , then t i e 1 ] t j e 2 ]. (The notation \t i e]" implies that P i executed e.) In Lamport's algorithm, each logical clock t i was implemented by an integer counter and \ " was normal integer less-than (<); thus, it was not possible to attain the converse of the clock condition, as well. Later, however, several researchers (e.g., Mattern, 1989] ) extended the notion of logical clocks to that of vector clocks and de ned a new relation \ " on them so that the converse condition could also be satis ed: T2: For any events e 1 and e 2 , if t i e 1 ] t j e 2 ], then e 1 ! e 2 . In the algorithm in Mattern, 1989] , each process P i maintains a vector clock t i = ht 1 i ; t 2 i ; : : :; t n i i, where n is the total number of processes in the system and for each k 2 f1; : : :; ng, t k i is a nonnegative integer. Vector clock values t = ht 1 ; : : :; t n i andt = ht 1 ; : : :;t n i are ordered according to the following relation: t t i for all k 2 f1; : : :; ng, t k t k , and there exists a k 2 f1; : : :; ng such that t k <t k . The algorithm to satisfy T1 and T2 is as follows: 1. When process P i begins execution, t i is initialized to all zeroes. 2. Process P i increments t i i before executing each event. 3. If send(m) is executed by process P i , then the timestamp T m = t i is sent with m. t i send(m)] is de ned to be t i . 4. If receive (m) is executed by process P j , then for all k 2 f1; : : :; ng, P j sets t k j to maxft k j ; T k m g, where T k m is the k-th component of T m . t j receive(m)] is then de ned to be t j .
Because the timestamp on a message m sent by P i is T m = t i send(m)] (by step 3), this algorithm can be seen as using the following predicate to determine causal relationships: C(m 1 ; m 2 ) = true if T m1 T m2 , false otherwise. In our system model, this algorithm does not su ce to prevent processes from forging causal relationships, because a corrupt process can easily manipulate components of vector timestamps. For instance, in Figure 1 , Q could easily fabricate a timestamp T m2 to make m 2 wrongly appear causally after m 1 .
We thus propose a technique to prevent this. In our approach, processes maintain vector clocks as before. However, each process P i digitally signs the i-th component of each timestamp it includes with a message, and this signed value is then propagated by other processes in the i-th components of the timestamps they include with their messages. So, when a process P i executes send(m), it includes with m a vector timestamp of the form T m = hft 1 i g K1 ; ft 2 i g K2 ; : : :; ft n i g Kn i; where for each k 6 = i, ft k i g Kk was received by P i in a previous receive event. The requirement that each (nonzero) component of a vector timestamp be signed by the corresponding process prevents corrupt processes from in ating components of correct processes.
More precisely, the algorithm executes as follows:
1. When process P i begins execution, t i is initialized to all zeroes. 2. Process P i increments t i i before executing each event. (m) is executed by process P j , and for all k 2 f1; : : :; ng, T k m is properly signed by P k or is zero, then for all k 2 f1; : : :; ng, P j sets t k j to maxft k j ; T k m g, where T k m = 0 if T k m = 0, and T k m = fT k m g Kk otherwise. Then, for each k 2 f1; : : :; ng such that t k j > 0, P j saves ft k j g Kk , which it either received as T k m or already had prior to this event. If some nonzero T k m is not properly signed by P k , then because communication channels between correct processes protect the integrity of communication, this message must be from a corrupt process and is therefore ignored.
Note that each T k m can always be computed by a correct process P i in step 3 of this algorithm, because if k 6 = i and t k i 6 = 0, then by step 4, T k m = ft k i g Kk was received and saved by P i in a previous receive event.
Processes detect causal relationships between messages with the same predicate as before, adjusted for the signatures: T k m2 by step 4. Moreover, if the sender of m 2 is P i , then T i m1 < T i m2 by step 2. So, by the de nition of \ " for vector timestamps, T m1 T m2 and T m2 6 T m1 . T i m2 implies that P i sent m 2 after m 1 . If another process sent m 2 , then there must be a causal chain by which T i m2 traveled from P i to the sender of m 2 . Because P i released T i m2 only with m 1 or a causally subsequent message, it follows that m 1 ! m 2 .
In this algorithm, if P i is correct, then corrupt processes cannot in ate timestamps' i-th components above their proper values, because the signatures for the in ated values are not predictable before P i releases them. Thus, this technique is similar to the use of nonce identi ers Needham and Schroeder, 1978] , in that causal relationships are established by the presence of \new," unpredictable, and veri able values (i.e., the signed components) in messages. However, our algorithm is more powerful because any process can verify each value, and not just the process that issued it. This technique also has other bene cial features; in particular, it requires no centralized servers, and communication can proceed completely asynchronously.
The primary weakness of this algorithm is its ability to scale. As n becomes large, signed vector timestamps could consume signi cant network bandwidth. Techniques similar to some of those described in for compressing timestamps in benign systems are appropriate for use in our system model but will not be discussed here. A second threat to scale is that the cost of computing and verifying signatures could be signi cant if n is large. However, a signature scheme with a fast veri cation algorithm could lessen this burden, because in this use, signatures will typically be veri ed more frequently than they are created.
6.2. The piggybacking algorithm Our second algorithm for satisfying F if the sender of m 1 is correct is based on a piggybacking technique that, to our knowledge, was rst used in an early version of the Isis system to detect causal relationships in benign settings Birman et al., 1987] . This algorithm is more costly than that in Section 6.1. However, it is interesting because it also satis es the following property (which is slightly weaker than F), even if both the senders of m 1 and m 2 are corrupt: ; m 2 ) is to be true). Moreover, we will describe additions to our algorithm that place even greater restrictions on the contents of m 1 .
Intuitively, the algorithm is very simple. When a process P sends a message m, it \piggybacks" on (i.e., includes with) m a set H m of all messages that P received in the past and the messages piggybacked on them. This is illustrated in Figure 3 , where P sends m 1 to R and then m to Q, and then Q sends m 2 to R. A process that receives two messages m 1 and m 2 considers m 1 to be causally before m 2 only if (a message with the same contents as) m 1 appears in H m2 . ; m 1 R Here P sends m1 to R and then sends m to Q, piggybacking m1 on m. Then, Q piggybacks m1 and m on message m2 to R. The piggybacking algorithm More precisely, the algorithm executes as follows: 1. Each process P i maintains a set h i that is initially empty. 2. If P i executes send(m), H m = h i is sent with m.
3. If P j executes receive (m), it sets h j to h j H m fmg:
Processes detect causal relationships as follows:
C(m 1 ; m 2 ) = true if m 1 2 H m2 , false otherwise. Here, \m 1 2 H m2 " means that a message with contents identical to m 1 appears in H m2 .
While the algorithm already satis es F 0 , additional measures must be taken to satisfy E and to satisfy F if the sender of m 1 is correct. To satisfy F under only the assumption that the sender of m 1 is correct, it must not be possible for the sender of m 2 to include (the contents of) m 1 in H m2 unless m 1 ! m 2 . That is, m 1 must be unpredictable. In addition, to satisfy E, the contents of messages sent by correct processes must be unique. To see why, suppose there exist messages m 1 and m 2 such that m 1 causally precedes m 2 by means of a causal chain traversing correct processes only. If the sender of m 2 had previously sent a message whose contents were identical to those of m 2 , then this message could appear in H m1 , causing C(m 2 ; m 1 ) to be true at a correct recipient of m 1 and m 2 .
One way to make correct processes' messages unique and unpredictable is for the k-th message m from P i to P j to be constructed in the form \fi; j; k : datag Ki " where data denotes the data to be sent in the message (not including H m ). Specifying i, j and k in the message makes the message contents unique, and including the signature makes the message contents unpredictable. Then, we can prove Theorem 6.2. This algorithm satis es E and F 0 , and satis es F if the sender of m 1 is correct.
Proof. E: Suppose there exists a causal chain e 1 ; : : :; e l such that e 1 = send(m 1 ), e l = send(m 2 ), and for each j 2 f1; : : :; lg, e j is executed at a correct process. By construction, m 1 2 H m2 ; so, C(m 1 ; m 2 ) is true. In addition, since the signature in m 2 rst appeared when m 2 was sent and because m 2 6 ! m 1 , m 2 could not be in H m1 . As mentioned earlier, F 0 is of interest primarily when the sender of m 2 is correct (and thus does not cooperate with the sender of m 1 to forge causal relationships). To see why, suppose that a corrupt process P intends to send a message m 1 , m 1 6 ! m 2 , so that C(m 1 ; m 2 ) is true at a correct common destination R. F 0 dictates that P choose the contents of m 1 from those messages m 3 such that m 3 ! m 2 . If m 2 has not yet been sent, P could try to predict its possible choices for m 1 and send these to the sender of m 2 . Once m 2 is sent, however, P's choices are limited.
Moreover, by adding some additional checking to our algorithm, we can further narrow the choices available for the contents of m 1 . Note that after receiving m 1 (on the channel from P) and m 2 , R can detect if the sender and receiver listed in m 1 are not P and R, respectively, m 1 is the k-th message that R received from P but the sequence number listed in m 1 is not k, m 1 is not properly signed by P, or there are multiple (non-identical) messages in H m2 listing the same sender, receiver, and sequence number as m 1 and bearing P's signature. Suppose that R de nes C(m 1 ; m 2 ) to be false if any of these hold (and thus P is corrupt), even if m 1 2 H m2 . Then, once m 2 is sent, P has at most one choice for the contents of each message m 1 it sends on its channel to R that will make C(m 1 ; m 2 ) true at R.
Several improvements to this algorithm can be made in practice. First, instead of piggybacking H m on each message m, a process need only piggyback those messages in H m not piggybacked on a prior message to the same destination. If the destination maintains messages piggybacked from each sender, then H m can be reconstructed when m is received. Second, in some cases it may be appropriate to forgo transmitting a message separately if it will eventually reach its destination piggybacked on another message. However, this delays the former message to be received no earlier than the latter.
A third improvement, which is incompatible with the second, uses message digests to limit the size of piggybacked messages. A message digest algorithm (e.g., Rivest, 1990] ) produces a xed length message digest from an input of arbitrary length, in such a way that it is computationally infeasible to produce any input having a prespeci ed target message digest, or to produce two inputs having the same message digest. So, for all practical purposes, a message digest uniquely identi es Securing Causal Relationships in Distributed Systems 9 an input. Using a message digest algorithm f, the algorithm can be modi ed to limit the length of piggybacked messages as follows: can also be employed in this new algorithm. Moreover, it is not di cult to verify that while the item D m created during a send(m) must contain a signature, the message m does not. So, this algorithm can be optimized further by not requiring a signature on m and removing the third of the four additional checks enumerated above.
Other possible improvements include garbage collecting messages from the h i 's (at the cost of sacri cing E in some cases), when causal relationships involving those messages are no longer of interest.
ON CAUSALITY AND FRESHNESS
Forgery prevention has applications to detecting freshness, a property that has been examined extensively by the security community. A message is fresh in a run of a protocol if its contents have not appeared in another message sent before this run of the protocol began Burrows et al., 1989; Abadi and Tuttle, 1991] . Freshness is most commonly studied in the context of cryptographic protocols in order to prevent replay attacks, in which an intruder replays messages from previous runs of the protocol in hopes of convincing the participants, e.g., to accept now-obsolete cryptographic keys. A predominant technique for detecting freshness in cryptographic protocols uses challenge-response techniques in conjunction with nonce identi ers Needham and Schroeder, 1978] : P challenges Q with a new nonce identi er, which Q must include in its response to P. The appearance of the nonce identi er in the response convinces P that Q's response is fresh. This method for detecting freshness can be generalized using the notion of causality, in the following way.
Given a predicate C that satis es F, the freshness of a message m 2 can be detected according to the following rule: if m 1 is considered fresh and C(m 1 ; m 2 ) is true, then m 2 should be considered fresh. The use of nonce identi ers as described above is simply an instance of this rule, in which the nonce identi ers are used to implement C. That is, the appearance of the nonce identi er in Q's response to P is the condition on which C will indicate that Q's message is causally after P's.
This relationship between freshness and causality, which we earlier noted in the preliminary version of this paper Reiter and Gong, 1993] , was later (independently) presented in a somewhat di erent framework by Yahalom 1993] . In that work, a related but di erent notion of freshness is studied, in which freshness is tied to the duration of time between two events. That is, a message is considered fresh if its sending preceded its receipt by at most a prespeci ed number of ticks on the recipient's local clock. In order to detect this condition, Yahalom argues that a means of verifying precedence and succession between events|or in our parlance, detecting causal relationships between events in a way that prevents forgery|is both necessary and su cient.
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
In this paper we have attempted to formalize the problems with detecting causality in hostile environments and to provide algorithms to overcome these problems in some situations. In particular, we have introduced two new notions|denial and forgery|that capture the ways in which causality can be mistakenly not detected or detected. We have presented two algorithms for preventing denial and two algorithms for preventing or limiting forgery in some situations.
Our previous studies of detecting causality in hostile environments include a research e ort directed at building secure distributed systems Reiter et al., 1992] . As part of that e ort, a variant of the conservative protocol of Section 5.2 has been implemented. One direction for future work is the implementation of other algorithms so that comparisons between them can be made in real systems. Other directions for future work are discussed in Section 8.2. 8.1. Related work Smith and Tygar 1993] have also examined the detection of causal relationships in hostile environments. In their work, they have similarly identi ed the detection of causal relationships to be important in hostile environments and have pursued ways of detecting causal relationships despite malicious behavior. In particular, they independently discovered a protocol similar to that of Section 6.1 of this paper Smith and Tygar, 1993] .
Despite these similarities, however, the works are also substantially di erent. Smith and Tygar arrived at a di erent formulation of the problem of detecting causal relationships and, to our knowledge, developed only an approach to preventing (what we call) forgery, namely the technique of signed vector timestamps described in Section 6.1 of this work. On the other hand, while we have studied causality detection only as an essential aspect of preserving integrity in distributed systems, they also raise consideration of the rami cations of causality detection on secrecy requirements. In particular, they introduce notions of forward con nement and backward con nement, which characterize requirements that information about a process not leak to other processes executing events causally after or before its own, respectively. Subsequent work by Smith and Tygar 1994] examines the application of trusted hardware coprocessors to these problems.
In other related work, Reiter 1994] addresses the issue of preventing causal denial speci cally among requests issued to a replicated service, some of whose clients and servers may have been corrupted by an intruder. The approach presented there does not fully prevent denial in the sense of the present paper, but nevertheless may su ce for many applications.
Future work
There are several directions for future work that we hope to pursue. The most obvious is to nd better algorithms to detect causal relationships. In particular, what can be done toward satisfying D or F if the sender of m 1 is corrupt should be examined more closely. Less general algorithms that exploit knowledge of communication patterns are also of interest, especially if applicable to large classes of distributed algorithms.
Another direction for future research is to explore the degree to which patterns of communication must be restricted to prevent denial and forgery in certain situations. It is interesting to note that both of our algorithms for preventing denial synchronize communication, in that they eliminate all executions in which there are messages m 1 and m 2 such that the sender of m 1 is correct, m 1 ! m 2 , and yet m 2 is received before m 1 at a correct common destination. On the contrary, neither of our algorithms for preventing forgery restrict patterns of communication at all. We suspect that these are not properties of our algorithms alone, but suggest requirements inherent in the problems.
Finally, another di cult problem is how a process P can determine whether it has received all messages sent to it that are causally prior to a certain received message. Such determinations are necessary if, e.g., P must deliver received messages to an application in an order consistent with the causal relationships among them (e.g., Schneider, 1990; ). The algorithms of Section 5 ensure that all causally prior messages have been received if all such messages are sent by correct processes, but this does not necessarily hold if a causally prior message is sent by a corrupt process.
